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Abstract
Immigration is an important feature of many societies, and it has wide-
ranging effects on the education systems of host countries. There is now a
large empirical literature, but very little theoretical work on this topic. We
study a model of family immigration in a framework where school quality
and student outcomes are determined endogenously. Within this framework,
we address two research questions. First, we study the effect of immigra-
tion on the different dimensions of the school system, such as student effort,
parental involvement, school incentives and resources and how the endoge-
nous response of the school system to immigration is interrelated with both
immigrants’ and natives’ educational choices. Second, we explain the selec-
tion of immigrants when schooling considerations are relevant for the im-
migration decision and discuss the selection effect of different immigration
policies.
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1 Introduction
Immigration is a prevalent feature of many societies. Immigrants bring their
families and have children. As a consequence, the future of the host societies
clearly depends on these children.1 First, these children have to be schooled
and, by changing classroom composition and school resources, they have a
sizable impact on school quality and the performance of their native peers.
Also, the school success of immigrant children has a direct impact on human
capital accumulation. Logically, the educational effect of immigration is a
core concern of policy makers and has attracted a massive research effort to
understand this phenomenon.2 Most of this effort is empirical and there is
relatively little theoretical work to contextualize the many recent findings in
the literature, to clarify the main mechanism at work and to inform future
empirical investigations. In this paper, we provide such a framework and
study the theoretical links between immigration and schooling.
In any theory connecting immigration to schooling, student outcomes
must be determined endogenously as a result of the interplay between differ-
ent families (immigrants and natives) and the school system. The schooling
effects of immigration must be mediated by parents’ characteristics, reflected
1For example, the US Census Bureau estimated in 2000, that 34% of all youth aged
15–19 were from minority groups and one in five school-age children live in immigrant
families (Kao and Thompson, 2003). According to the Innocenti Research Center, in 2009
almost a quarter of children were immigrants in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and
the United States. This proportion is about one-sixth in France and Great Britain (Alba,
Sloan, and Sperling, 2011).
2Studies like those conducted by PISA, and other international organizations (like
TIMSS or PIRLS), have allowed for the empirical analysis of immigrant educational success
and the externalities imposed on natives. In many countries, a large fraction of immigrant
children face substantial disadvantages in reaching educational parity with native children
(Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi1, 2008; Anghel and Cabrales, 2010). Australia and Canada
are the big exceptions where immigrants often outperform natives before controlling for
individual characteristics (Schnepf, 2004). It is also not at all rare for some immigrant
students to be top of the class (see Card (2005), Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010)
and Dustmann, Frattini, and Theodoropoulos (2010)). Dustmann and Glitz (2010) has an
overview on migration and education. Researchers by now agree that immigrant students
perform differently by origin group (Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp, 2008) and (Lev-
els and Dronkers, 2008) and cross-nationally (Marks, 2005). Even immigrants from the
same origin perform differently according to their destination country (Bertoli, Fernandez-
Huertas Moraga, and Ortega, 2010, forthcoming). Moreover, the immigration mix differs
considerably across countries, which is only partially due to colonial links (Alba, Sloan,
and Sperling (2011), based on Kirszbaum, Brinbaum, and Simon (2009)).
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for example in their wages, and their involvement in their children’s educa-
tion process. While wages may reflect talent or skills, parental involvement
reflects the parents’ concerns in their children’s educational achievement. We
refer to this attribute as “motivation”. Within this framework, we address
two different but related research questions. First, we study the effect of
immigration on the different dimensions of the school system, such as stu-
dent effort, parental involvement, school incentives and resources and how
the endogenous response of the school system to immigration is interrelated
with both immigrants’ and natives’ educational choices. Second, we explain
the selection of immigrants in terms of parental motivation and discuss how
different types of immigrants are selected according to different immigration
policies.
We develop a new model of the school system similar to Albornoz, Berlin-
ski, and Cabrales (2011). Children are short-sighted and need to be moti-
vated to study. Parents divide their time between working and motivating
their children, and they decide whether or not to emigrate. Schools provide
additional motivational schemes to enhance children’s learning effort. The
effect of these schemes depends on school resources, which are determined
by the education policy. The contribution of this framework is to emphasize
that learning is a process involving the interaction among children, parents,
schools and the decision of school resources. Thus, attainment and school
quality are endogenously determined by classroom composition, which is it-
self affected directly by immigration.
We show that the educational effect of immigration crucially depends
on immigrant parental motivation and that the overall effect of immigrant
children depends on the characteristics of the average native compared to the
average immigrant parents. We establish first that children’s learning effort
increase in parental motivation. This result links the effects of immigration
on schools to immigrant self-selection and how immigration affects classroom
composition. Of course, more (less) motivated immigrants would involve
more positive (negative) effects on the host country school system, but these
effects are mediated by the characteristics of both the native parents and
the pre-immigration school system. We show, for example, that, although
a negative selection of immigrant parents reduces the school effort of native
students, this particularly hits native students with relatively low parental
motivation; a result that has been uncovered as a regularity in many empirical
studies (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman, 2004).
We also look at the effect of immigration on school resources in a world
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where public schools are financed by parents through taxes. We assume that
the policy maker maximizes the utility of the median voter parent, and show
that school resources increase in immigrant motivation. Hence, a negative
selection in parental motivation hits the native students directly through the
reaction of teachers and indirectly through a reduction in school resources
by the policy maker. This suggests that at least part of the performance
of schools with increasing number of immigrant children may be explained
by the response of the education policy to immigration, and not only to the
presence of immigrants themselves.
We embed our theory of education into a model of immigration decisions.
We show that whether or not highly motivated parents are more likely to em-
igrate crucially depends on two conditions. The first condition relates current
wage gains of immigration with the ratio of the benefits from education in
the host and origin countries. The second condition refers to the external
environment children are exposed to, which depends on the characteristics
of the schools they attend.
Positive selection will occur if parents provide more learning incentives
abroad than at home. This requires that the ratio of skill-wage differentials
between sending and receiving countries is high enough, since the absolute
skill premium reflects the gains from education. Additionally, the external
environment children face has to be more beneficial abroad. This environ-
ment has two components: (i) the expected unskilled wage for children and
(ii) the expected learning incentives provided by schools which are weighted
by the expected absolute skill premium. While the conditions for positive
selection guarantee that the learning motivation provided in the foreign coun-
try is higher than the one of the sending country, positive selection does not
require a better school system abroad if unskilled wages are sufficiently higher
abroad than at home. Clearly, if the two conditions fail, selection will then
be negative. Interestingly, if the first condition is not satisfied but the second
one is, then selection falls on parents with an intermediate range of motiva-
tion. This happens when the absolute skill premium is smaller abroad than
at home and unskilled wages abroad are not that much higher than at home.
Our analysis shows how school considerations are relevant to understand im-
migrant selection even if the school quality at the host country is not a (first
order) motive for immigration. It also shows how the exogenous quality of
the school system induces the selection of most motivated immigrants.
One advantage of our framework is tractability. We can study the impact
of various policies for the selection of immigrants in terms of their moti-
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vation. For example, we study policies that allow immigrant children to
naturalize and the effects of unanticipated family reunification program for
temporary immigrants.3 We also analyze the possibility that parents differ
in their preferences about the values transmitted by the school. As a conse-
quence, cultural alienation may emerge for those parents whose values differ
substantially from those transmitted by the school. We show that cultural
alienation may lead to negative selection. This suggests that school flexibility
to incorporate different cultural values is a relevant tool to induce the arrival
of the most motivated immigrants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model of parental motivation and the school system. In section 3, we
study the effects of immigration on school system. Section 4 looks at the
implications of immigration for school resources. In section 5, we study im-
migrant selection and discuss under which circumstances higher emigration
costs can improve parental selection. Section 6 turns to the question of nat-
uralization policies and what type of parent would emigrate if children were
not able to come. We also study how the cultural orientation at school might
interfere with immigrant selection. Section 7 discusses further implications of
our model and concludes. After each prediction of our model, we document
supportive empirical evidence. All proofs not in the main text are gathered
in a technical appendix.
2 Parental motivation and the school system
In this section, we develop the basic model of the school system. Our model
of the school system is similar to Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011),
where the school system results from the interaction of students (children,
who need incentives to put effort on learning), parents (who work and set
up costly incentives schemes for students), and teachers/headmasters (who
decide on the incentive scheme provided at schools). We now describe our
different actors in detail. We assume that every parent has one child.
The students’ utility function:
The students are children who perceive learning as costly, because they
would rather play, and do not internalize the future benefits of studying
today. As a consequence, they need to be motivated to exert learning effort.
3As happened in the case of many guest worker programs around the world.
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The incentive scheme is put into place by parents and the school. Let c1i
be the parent i’s reward for every unit of his child’s effort ei and c2 be the
school’s reward. As suggested by empirical evidence (Houtenville and Smith
Conway, 2008; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2011), we assume that parents and
school incentives are substitutes.4 Then, children’s short-term utility is given
by:
U ci = (c1i + c2) ei −
1
2
e2i , (1)
where 1
2
e2i is the cost of learning.
The parents’ utility function:
Unlike children, parents understand the long-term consequences of their
children’s choices today, namely how the child’s learning effort when young
influences the child labor market prospects in the future. In particular, the
probability that the child will work in a high-skilled job equals the child’s
learning effort ei, while the child will become an unskilled worker with prob-
ability (1 − ei). Wages at skilled jobs and unskilled jobs are denoted by φS
and φU respectively. These wages can differ across countries as well as be-
tween natives and immigrants. Hence a child’s future labor market prospect
is given by
(
φSei + (1− ei)φU
)
.
A parent has to split her total time T between working and providing
incentives to her child. How much time a parent dedicates to generating
educational incentives for her child depends on parental motivation and the
cost of generating the reward. Parental motivation is modeled as the weight
θi a parent gives to her child’s labor market prospect in her utility func-
tion.5 The time to generate the reward is given by c1iei/2 while the cost of
generating incentives for their child is the foregone parental wage, given by:
w′i = φ
′
i, (2)
4No qualitative change ensues if we assume the incentives to be complementary. This is
because the substitutability at the children’s utility level is mitigated by complementarities
elsewhere. Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011) discuss this issue in depth.
5Empirically, parental motivation is likely to be positively correlated with parental
work ethic. Although this link is not captured in the present model, it is easy to extend
the model to incorporate work ethic by letting parents allocate their time between leisure,
education and work and assuming that the same parameter affects the weight given to
education and inversely the enjoyment of leisure. This specification was used in a former
version of the model leading to qualitatively similar results.
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where φ′i is the parental wage.
6 Hence, the parental utility function is given
by the expression
UPi = θi
(
φSei + (1− ei)φU
)
+
(
T − 1
2
c1iei
)
φ′i. (3)
The school’s utility function:
Schools/teachers also fully understand and care about the future job per-
spectives of their students, assigning weight θT to the average student’s suc-
cess. The teachers have to decide how much of the time TT that remains
after teaching their compulsory hours they will use to motivate their stu-
dents (such as training or preparing learning activities), and how much they
will use for outside job opportunities (such as private tuition) which are paid
at wage rate γT . The teacher’s time spent generating the reward c2 is equal
to 1
2N
∑N
i=1
1
2
c2ei where N is the total number of children in the classroom.
The school’s utility function is therefore
UHM =
θT
N
N∑
i=1
(
φSei + (1− ei)φU
)
+
(
TT − 1
2N
N∑
i=1
c2ei
)
γT . (4)
Let N = NI + NN where NI is the number of immigrant children and NN
the number of native children. We can rewrite the school’s utility function
as
UHM =
θT
N
((
φS − φU)(NN∑
k=1
ek +
NI∑
i=l
el
)
+ φUN
)
+
(
TT − c2
2N
(
NN∑
k=1
ek +
NI∑
l=1
el
))
γT .
The structure of the game: The school system is modeled as a two-
stage game. In the first stage, parents and schools simultaneously decide and
6Our model could be modified to incorporate parental talent v′i. On the one hand,
parental talent v′i increases wages w
′
i = v
′φ′i. On the other hand parental talent decreases
the time parents need to spend for generating their child’s incentive reward. This time
is now given by c1iei/2v
′
i. Introducing talent into our model would only complicate the
exposition but would not affect the main results.
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announce optimal levels of rewards per unit of effort: c1 and c2 respectively.
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After observing these announcements, children decide their optimal effort ei.
Equilibrium: We solve the game by backward induction.
In the second stage children choose their optimal effort ei by maximizing
their utility function (1) taking parental incentives c1i and school incentives
c2 as given. This leads to the following optimal effort decision by the children
∂U c
∂ei
= 0 = c1i + c2 − ei
ei = c1i + c2. (5)
In other words, children’s effort is simply the sum of parental and school
incentives. We can now turn to the first-stage of the game where we need to
substitute this expression (5) into the parent’s utility (3) and the school’s
utility (??). Taking the optimal effort decision of children (5) into account,
the teacher’s problem is to choose the level of c2 that maximizes
UHM =
θT
N
((
φS − φU)(NN∑
k=1
(c1k + c2) +
NI∑
l=1
(c1l + c2)
)
+ φUN
)
+
(
TT − c2
2N
(
NN∑
k=1
(c1k + c2) +
NI∑
l=1
(c1l + c2)
))
γT .
leading to the optimal school incentives
c2 =
θT
γT
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NIcI1
2N
, (6)
where
cN1 =
1
NN
NN∑
k=1
cN1i, c
I
1 =
1
NI
NI∑
l=1
cI1l.
The incentives set by schools depend on the average parental involvement of
both natives and immigrants, to which we turn now. Parents choose their
incentive scheme c1 to maximize
7In order to ensure a interior solution, we impose motivation rewards to be positive as
to avoid corner solutions where c1 and c2 may be zero.
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UPi = θi
(
φS (c1i + c2) + (1− (c1i + c2))φU
)
+
(
T − 1
2
(c1i + c2) c1i
)
φ′i.
leading to the optimal parental choice
c1i =
(
φS − φU) θi
φ′i
− 1
2
c2. (7)
In order to save some notation let us define
ψi =
θi
φ′i
, (8)
that is, as the ratio of parental motivation to their wage. Also, we define
the average motivation to parental wage ratio among the native and foreign
population as
Ωk =
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
θi
φ′i
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
ψi for k = N, I. (9)
Using this notation, we can now derive the interior solution of the game.
Lemma 1 For a given school the optimal level of incentives set by the school
and by native parents j = N and immigrant parents j = I are
cj1l = max
[
0,
(
φS − φU)(ψjl − 23 θTγT + NIΩI +NNΩN3(NN +NI)
)]
(10)
c2 = max
[
0,
2
3
(
φS − φU)(2θT
γT
− NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)]
. (11)
If both the schools and the child’s parent l choose positive incentives the cor-
responding child i′s effort is
eji =
(
φS − φU)(ψjl + 23 θTγT − NIΩI +NNΩN3(NN +NI)
)
for j = N, I (12)
Proof. See the appendix.
The above expressions indicate that the schools and parental incentives
are substitutes. Both incentives are driven by the potential gains from educa-
tion captured by
(
φS − φU). School incentives increase in school motivation
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θT and decrease in teacher’s outside job opportunities γT and in average ratio
of parental motivation to wage, since NIΩI+NNΩN
(NN+NI)
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 ψi. The higher
this average, which implies the more parents care on average for education,
the more incentives parents provide.
An interior solution (i.e. a solution with eji ≤ 1) exists where both the
parents and the school provide positive incentives for some conditions on the
distribution of ψjl . Specifically, positive incentives require ψ
j
l +
NIΩI+NNΩN
3(NN+NI)
>
2
3
θT
γT
> NIΩI+NNΩN
3(NN+NI)
which is a relationship comparing parental motivation and
their wages with school motivation and wages for outside job opportunities
for teachers. Observe that θ
T
γT
can be interpreted as a measure of school
quality. Hence the condition for positive incentives can be interpreted as
a relationship between school quality and parental quality defined by the
tradeoff between parental care and marginal cost of education ψ.
Until now we have allowed parental concerns to be unrelated with school
concerns. However, it is realistic to assume that parental motivation pos-
itively reinforces school motivation. This corresponds to situations where
teachers’ incentives are encouraged by interacting with highly motivated
parents. It is demoralizing for teachers to deal with disinterested parents
or, more generally, with student apathy. To capture this link formally, we
postulate:
Assumption 1 θT depends on the average parental motivation. That is,
θT = kθ =
k
N
N∑
i=1
θi, (13)
where N is the number of parents affecting the education of a particular school
class of children and k indicates the exogenous weight that the school assigns
to the future wages of their students.
We are now in a position to analyze how parental motivation in general
and immigrants’ parental motivation in particular affect the quality of the
school system.
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2.1 The effect of parental skill levels on school incen-
tives
Using assumption 1 in equation (11), we can express the incentives provided
by a particular school as:
c2 = max
[
0,
2
(
φS − φU)
3N
N∑
i=1
((
2k
γT
− 1
φ′i
)
θi
)]
, (14)
Hence schools will only provide positive incentives if
N∑
i=1
(
2k
γT
− 1
φ′i
)
θi > 0. (15)
We will derive the conditions for positive school incentives in a world where
parents can have skilled and unskilled jobs. We also show how school incen-
tives react to parental motivation.
Proposition 1 In a school with NU unskilled and NS skilled parents with
corresponding wages φU and φS = αφU , where α > 1, the school will provide
positive incentives if
φS = αφU >
γT
2k
(16)
and
φU >
(β + α) γTl
2 (1 + β) kα
(17)
where β =
∑NS
i=1 θi/
∑NU
i=1 θi.
These school incentives always increase in the parental motivation of
skilled parents. If
φU >
γT
2k
(18)
school incentives also increase in parental motivation of unskilled parents.
However, if (18) fails then school incentives decrease in the parental motiva-
tion of unskilled parents.
Proof. The condition for positive school incentives given by (15) cannot be
satisfied if 2k
γT
< 1
φ′i
for both skilled and unskilled parents which leads us to
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(16). However, we might allow for the possibility that (18) fails. In this case
the requirement for positive school incentives becomes
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
2k
γTl
− 1
φ′i
)
θi =
1
NS +NU
∑
i∈NS∪NU
(
2k
γT
− 1
φ′i
)
θi > 0
which is equivalent to:
β =
∑
i∈NS θi∑
i∈NU θi
>
1
φU
− 2k
γTl
2k
γT
− 1
αφU
=
α
(
γT − 2kφU)
2kαφU − γT ⇐⇒ φ
U >
(β + α) γT
2 (1 + β) kα
To see how positive school incentives change with parental motivation we
need to look at
sign
∂c2
∂θi
= sign
(
2k
γT
− 1
φ′i
)
,
which tells us that the incentives provided by the school (14) increase in
parental motivation for parents whose wages are such that 2k/γT > 1/φ′i
which translates into condition (16) for skilled parents and condition (18) for
unskilled parents and decrease in parental motivation for parents with wages
such that 2k/γT < 1/φ′i .
Note that condition (16) and condition (18) state that parental wages
cannot be too low compared to the ratio of school’s opportunity cost of
providing students incentives to the weight schools give to the future per-
formance of the children (which can be interpreted as the inverse of school
quality). These condition will hold for high k schools (schools highly con-
cerned with their students’ future) and for countries where γT is low and are
arguably a relatively mild assumption for high-skilled parents.
The weaker condition (17) for unskilled parents is more easily satisfied the
higher the levels of α and β, that is, for countries where the wage gap between
high and low skilled jobs is big and where total parental motivation is higher
for skilled parents than for unskilled parents (β > 1). Not surprisingly a
fall in exogenous school quality (2k/γT ) will eventually lead to a violation of
condition (17), pushing in turn school incentives to zero.
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3 The effects of immigration on the school
system
School incentives are difficult to observe. For this reason, student outcomes
constitute a typical empirical measure of school quality. We therefore need
to examine children’s learning effort in more detail. It is clear from equation
(12) that among children in the same school it is their parents’ characteristics
ψi, that determines who has the higher learning effort. If we apply this to the
difference in learning effort between an immigrant child and a native child,
then
eIi − eNj =
(
ψIi − ψNj
) (
φS − φU) = ( θIi
φ′Ii
− θ
N
j
φ′Nj
)(
φS − φU) ,
which implies that for immigrant children to make greater effort on average
than the natives, the following condition has to be satisfied:
1
NI
∑
i∈NI
eIi >
1
NN
∑
i∈NN
eNi whenever
1
NI
∑
i∈NA
θIl
φ′Il
>
1
NN
∑
i∈NN
θNi
φ′Nl
.
Having established this, the next proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 2 The children of immigrants exert more effort at a given
school than natives if and only if the average of the ratio of parental mo-
tivation to wage in the immigrant parents’ group is larger than that of native
parents.
While Proposition 2 is stated for the school level, it generally holds when
the environment of immigrants and natives are the same. In a country as a
whole it would hold if all schools are the same and immigrants and natives
are equally distributed among schools.
Using assumption 1 allows us to derive how a child’s learning effort de-
pends on parental motivation, namely
ei =
(
φS − φU)( θi
φ′i
+
1
3N
N∑
i=1
(
2k
γT
− 1
φ′i
)
θi
)
, (19)
From this equation it is straightforward to establish:
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Proposition 3 Children’s learning effort is always increasing in parental
motivation.
Proof. This follows from ∂ei
∂θi
> 0
Although fairly simple, this result has some interesting implications.
The channels through which motivation affects performance:
First, even in situations where school incentives decrease in parental mo-
tivation, the direct effect of rising parental involvement on student effort
offsets its negative impact on the school. Hence, the greater learning ef-
fort of children from highly motivated parents must come because of the
parents’ higher demands. The empirical evidence of pushy immigrant par-
ents is vast in the case of immigration to the US. As shown by Glick and
White (2004) and Hao and Bonstead-Bruns (1998), immigrant parents are
associated with greater demands on their children in terms of school engage-
ment and academic achievement. Keller and Tillman (2008) find that both
parental and self-reported expectations have significant direct effects on col-
lege attendance. Goyette and Xie (1999) provide evidence that in the US the
behaviors and expectations of Asian immigrant parents’ tend to raise their
children’s school attendance above the average.
Effects on natives and immigrants: Turning to the effect of immi-
gration on schooling, proposition 3 implies that this effect is mediated by
parental characteristics and the way immigrants are schooled. To see this
more clearly, we can rewrite (19) and obtain:
ei =
(
φSl − φUl
) θi
φ′i
+
1
2
cl2. (20)
This expression allows us to analyze how immigration affects the perfor-
mance of native pupils. For a given school, the relative effect of immigra-
tion on native children varies with their parents’ characteristics, which are
captured by ψi = θi/φ
′
i. A change in c
l
2 simply shifts the initial c1 up (if
immigrants are better on average) or down (otherwise), and therefore the
effect on ei is lower the higher the initial c1 or equivalently, for children as-
sociated with a higher ψi. In other words, the performance of disadvantaged
children (low ψi parents) is more affected by immigration than that of their
more advantaged classmates (high ψi parents). The evidence for this is very
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strong. Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2009) provide evidence for this predic-
tion. Focusing on the mass migration wave from the former Soviet Union
to Israel in the early 1990s, they find a negative effect of immigrants on
native outcomes which is larger for natives from a more disadvantaged so-
cial background. Similarly, Betts (1998) shows that immigration reduces the
probability of completing high-schools for American-native minorities (Blacks
and Hispanics). No negative effect of immigrants is found for non-minority
groups. Finally Brunello and Rocco (2011) study whether a higher share of
immigrant pupils affects the school performance of natives using aggregate
multi-country data from PISA. They find evidence of a negative and statisti-
cally significant relationship but the size of the estimated effect is small and
it is bigger for natives with a relatively disadvantaged parental background.8
Expression (20) also allows us to examine the effect of schools on immi-
grant performance. A typical measure of school quality is the pre-immigration
performance or general performance of its native pupils. As discussed above,
overall native performance is partly driven by c2. According to (20), a higher
level of c2 would benefit all children at the school, and hence this would in-
clude the immigrant children. This is consistent with the vast evidence sug-
gesting that better schools benefit immigrants (Dronkers and Fleischmann,
2010). The “Operation Solomon”provides a natural experiment for this re-
sult. This refers to the exodus of 15,000 Ethiopian immigrants, who were
airborne to Israel within 36 hours in May 1991. Importantly, they were ran-
domly sorted across the country. According to our model the average per-
formance of those immigrants who were randomly placed into better schools
should be higher. As shown by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004), this was
exactly the case: those Ethiopians who were assigned to better elementary
schools9 had better results in high school.
The impact on segregation and of segregation: So far, we have
always considered exogenous classroom composition. But a corollary of the
previous point is that the selection of immigrants can have important impli-
cations on school segregation. If the selection of immigrants is negative, or
8Similarly, Ohinata and van Ours (2011) find no evidence of negative spillovers of
immigrants on native Dutch children. They do find however that the share of immigrants
in a classroom is negatively associated with the reading scores of immigrant children.
9The measure of better elementary schools used by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004)
was the average standardized maths scores before Ethiopian entered or other environmen-
tal measures such as welfare rate and average high school matriculation rate.
15
even if positive, if it involves mainly unskilled workers, this can easily lead
to a flight from some schools into others. In many countries this implies a
flight to the private schools sector. Indeed, Betts and Fairlie (2003) find that
American native students fly toward private secondary schools in response
to the influx of immigrants into public institutions. Also, Berniell (2010)
discussing the massive recent flow of immigrants into Spain shows that “in
1998-99, when the fraction of immigrants in Madrid was only 2.6%, about
59% of natives were attending public schools, while one decade later -when
immigrants comprised 17% of total population roughly 50% of natives chose
public institutions. On the other hand, in 1998-99 only 68% of immigrant
parents were choosing public schools, while in 2008-09 this number raised to
77%.”
In a world with skilled and unskilled workers school incentives can also
be rewritten as
c2 =
2
(
φSl − φUl
)
3 (NU +NS)
((
2k
γTl
− 1
φU
)
NUθU +
(
2k
γTl
− 1
αφU
)
NSθS
)
. (21)
Assume that (18) holds, which is likely in countries which are targeted
by immigration since these countries typically have a reasonable exogenous
level of school quality (2k/γT ).
Consider situations where schools are segregated by the skill level of par-
ents, i.e. children of unskilled workers are schooled together and so are chil-
dren of skilled workers. Then, the natives always benefit if immigrants have
a high parental motivation, and they suffer otherwise. In countries where
children of skilled and unskilled parents are schooled together and randomly
assigned to schools, immigration is likely to change the skilled/unskilled com-
position of the classroom. If immigrants are positively selected according to
parental motivation and are only high-skilled workers matched to high-skilled
jobs, the effect on native student’s effort is positive. If, however, immigrants
are all positively selected but unskilled and the overall classroom size is con-
stant, then selection has to be extremely restrictive in the sense that only
immigrants with the highest motivation are admitted for the overall effect
on school incentives to be positive. Similarly, a negative selection of only
unskilled immigrants will always affect natives negatively, while a negative
selection of skilled immigrants has to be extremely negative to have the same
effect. If skilled and unskilled immigrants come in the same proportion than
skilled and unskilled natives, a positive (negative) selection in parental mo-
tivation will always benefit (harm) native children.
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4 The effect of immigration on school resources
We are now going to endogenize school resources to see whether some new
effects arise from the feedback between immigrants’ ethos and resource pro-
vision. Let us denote by r the amount of resources an administration gives to
a particular school. This could be thought of as class size (or teacher-student
ratio) as well as other resources, such as support to teaching staff, computers
and other means of making the provision of incentives easier for teachers.
The level of resources, r which is the same for all schools is announced by
the policymaker before parents and headmasters decide on the level of incen-
tives, so they take r as given when they make their decisions. Given r the
utility of a headmaster is now:
UHM =
θT
N
N∑
i=1
(
φSei + (1− ei)φU
)
+
(
T − 1
2rN
N∑
i=1
eic2
)
γT . (22)
Following the previous analysis, we can obtain the equilibrium values of
the key variables of the school system:
Lemma 2 The optimal incentives set by parents are given by
cj1l =
(
φS − φU)(ψjl − 23 rθTγT + NIΩI +NNΩN3(NN +NI)
)
for j = N, I. (23)
while the optimal school incentives are
cA2 =
2
3
(
φS − φU)(2rθT
γT
− NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
. (24)
The learning effort of an immigrant child and a native child given by (5) are
therefore
eji =
(
φS − φU)(ψjl + 23 rθTγT − NIΩI +NNΩN3(NN +NI)
)
for j = N, I (25)
Proof. See the appendix.
Now we introduce the utility of the policymaker who decides the level of
resources for the schools. The policymaker maximizes the complete utility
of the (median-voter) parent (denoted by P¯i) which requires adding the cost
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of the school resources (r). This median-voter is a native, and in fact we
are choosing him as the median of the natives, as in most countries first-
generation immigrants do not get the right of vote, or they get it when they
are naturalized at which point most of their children will have already gone
(at least partially) through the education system.10 The costs of resources
r are paid by parents through general taxation, which parents care about,
and are internalized by the policymaker when deciding r. Resource costs are
assumed to be quadratic.11
Thus, we can represent the policymaker’s preferences as,
UPM = UPM −
ρ
2
r2, (26)
where ρ is a constant parameter summarizing the cost of resources. Our
formulation assumes that schools are financed out of lump sum taxation and
the government keeps a balanced budget.
Substituting (25) and (23) into (26), and then optimizing UPM over r we
obtain:
r =
(
φS − φU)2 2
3
θT
γT
(
θiM + φiM
(
NIΩI+NNΩN
3(NN+NI)
))
ρ− φiM
(
(φS − φU)2
(
2
3
θT
γT
)2)
Note that resources increase in the motivation of the immigrant popula-
tions through two sources. First r is increasing in θT which by assumption 1
depends on the average motivation of the student parents. Secondly, it also
depends positively on the motivation of immigrants through ΩI . Hence, the
motivation of immigrants reinforces the effects of immigrants selection that
happen through c2, which we already discussed in section 3. Thus, a poorly
selected immigrant population hits the native students (and the more moti-
vated immigrants) directly through school incentives, and indirectly through
a reduction in school resources by the policymakers.
10To become a US citizen an immigrant must have been a permanent resident for at least
five years. Becoming a permanent resident also takes a few years, and we are considering
immigrants who already have children at the time they emigrate.
11This can be justified by taking into consideration that the state has monopsony power
in the market for teachers and faces a marginal cost function that increases in the num-
ber of teachers hired. This is so, for example, because to attract one more teacher the
monopsonist has to pay an extra cost, since the marginal potential teacher needs a higher
reward to be attracted to the profession.
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Several authors have found evidence that bad immigrant selection leads
to a reduction in public spending on schooling. Using a quantitative model of
school choice and voting over public education Coen-Pirani (Forthcoming)
shows that education spending per student in California would have been
24 percent higher in the year 2000 if U.S. immigration had been restricted
to its 1970 level. As in our paper, Coen-Pirani (Forthcoming) abstracts
from illegal immigration and allows only native households to vote. His
calibrated parameters indicate that immigrants in California care relatively
less for education than natives, hence our model provides an alternative ex-
planation for his findings. The relationship between resources dedicated to
public schools and immigration is also examined by Dottori and Shen (2008) .
They provide cross-country evidence (e.g. a mean-difference test) that coun-
tries that experience negative changes in public expenditure per pupil from
1990 to 2004 (Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set) are those with larger
increases in the low-skilled immigrants’ share of the population (UNESCO
data). This finding is consistent with our model, if low-skilled immigrants
are also less concerned about education on average than high skilled immi-
grants. Indeed, this negative correlation disappears when Dottori and Shen
(2008) look at changes in the share of immigrants with tertiary education and
lagged changes in public expenditure per pupil. As we also discussed in sec-
tion 3, these effects will be reinforced if, in addition, there is a flight of natives
away from public schools into private ones, as Berniell (2010) documents has
happened in Spain recently, for example.
There is possibly one more channel for immigrants’ motivation to impact
education. So far, we have assumed that the median voter is the median of the
natives, the only ones who can vote. But suppose that immigrants earn the
right of vote sufficiently early after arrival to the destination country. Then,
poorly selected immigrants would shift the median voter toward an individual
who cares less about education and hence lowers the level of resources even
further. Obviously, the vicious cycle of selection becomes virtuous in case of
positive selection. There is a higher level of c2, a higher level of resources r
and the immigrant effect may be improved by enfranchising the immigrants.
Another important observation is that our assumption on funding re-
sources implies that immigrants are legal, so they pay taxes. If they are
illegal (non-tax paying) but exogenous in number, we would effectively have
a higher level of ρ, which would entail a lower level of resources. If they
were illegal and also their number were endogenous, an increase in resources
would bring more of them, and the effect is less easy to compute but sim-
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ilar to having a technology with more rapidly decreasing returns to extra
resources.
5 Immigrant self-selection
The previous section tells us that it is crucial for the future human capital
of an immigration receiving country that immigrant selection is positive in
terms of parental motivation. We therefore need to study the immigration
decision to understand whether or not this positive selection can be induced.
We now assume that there are two countries: Home H (the source or
origin) and Abroad A (the destination or host). Each parent i in country H
faces a fixed cost of immigration Fi.The variable Fi follows the distribution
F (.) in a large compact interval. We will allow for immigration policies to
affect this distribution.
Both countries have a skilled and unskilled labor market and their schools
system can be described by the model of the previous section.12 However,
they may differ in the economic opportunities and the quality of the school
system. Parents have expectations concerning these parameters and will be
able to calculate their expected utility when living abroad and their expected
utility of staying at home and will emigrate if the utility difference is bigger
than their realized immigration cost. Let U jPi denote parental utility when
living within country j, namely
U jPi = θi
(
eji
(
φSj − φUj
)
+ φUj
)− 1
2
cj1ie
j
iφ
′j
i + Tφ
′j
i for j = H,A (27)
Using the optimal incentive and effort decisions derived in Lemma 1 we can
write parental utility after some simplification as
U jPi = Tφ
′j
i + θiφ
U
j +
φ′ji
2
(
ej
∗
i
)2
for j = H,A (28)
where ej
∗
i is the optimal learning effort of i
′s child when schooled in country
j which by (12) is
ej
∗
i =
(
φSj − φUj
)(
ψjl +
2
3
θTj
γTj
− Ωj
3
)
for j = N,A
12We are implicitly assuming that how learning incentives translate into the probability
of getting a skilled job in the country in which education was received is the same across
countries. The crucial element in our analysis is that learning effort is endogenously
determined according to different country characteristics.
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where Ωj =
1
Nj
∑Nj
k=1 ψ
j
k is the average parental motivation to expected wage
ratio in a school in country j. We can therefore write parental utility as
U jPi = Tφ
′j
i + θiφ
U
j (29)
+
(
φSj − φUj
)2
2
 θ2i
φ′ji
+ 2θi
(
2
3
θTj
γTj
− Ωj
3
)
+ φ′ji
(
2
3
θTj
γTj
− Ωj
3
)2
Observe that the first term of parental utility Tφ′ji corresponds to the
maximum earnings from working (what a parent can get by working all the
time), while the second term θiφ
U
j reflects the parental utility if the child does
not make any educational effort. Providing incentives to children increases
the parental utility whenever skilled jobs are better paid than unskilled jobs;
that is if φS > φU as is reflected in the third term of (29).
A parent i will emigrate from country H to country A if UAPi − Fi > UHPi .
From (29) it follows that
Lemma 3 UAPi − Fi > UHPi if and only if
T
(
φ′Ai − φ′Hi
)
+ θi
(
φUA − φUH
)
(30)
+
θ2i
2
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′Ai
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′Hi
)
+θi
((
φSA − φUA
)2(2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA
3
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(23 θTHγTH − ΩH3
))
+
1
2
(
φ′Ai
(
2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA
3
)2 (
φSA − φUA
)2 − φ′Hi (23 θTHγTH − ΩH3
)2 (
φSH − φUH
)2)
> Fi.
Since the primary motive for emigration is the possibility to take advan-
tage of better economic opportunities, we assume that wages abroad are at
least as high as wages at home and one of the three wage parameters (ex-
pected parental wage φ′i, expected child’s wage if skilled φ
S and if unskilled
φU) must be strictly higher. Then we can interpret the condition for immi-
gration in Lemma 3 as follows: T
(
φ′Ai − φ′Hi
)
+ θi
(
φUA − φUH
)
describes the
wage gain due to immigration if the immigrant parent dedicates all the time
to work. The parent might get a higher expected pay φ′A ≥ φ′H and the un-
skilled child might also earn more money φUA ≥ φUH which is weighted by the
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parental concern parameter θi. The remaining 3 lines of the sum describe the
change in parental utility from emigrating that is achieved by incentivating
the child at school and can be rewritten as
φ′A
2
e2A− φ
′
H
2
e2H (see equation (28)).
Parents and schools want to incentivate children to increase their chance to
get a high-skilled job, which is why the absolute difference between skilled
and unskilled wages enters in the three parts of the sum that corresponds to
the parental utility derived from the child’s effort. Since the parental wage is
the opportunity cost of incentivating the child, a higher wage has a negative
effect on effort as captured by φ′ dividing in the second line of the sum. How-
ever, since school incentives are substitutes to parental incentives a higher φ′
has an indirect effect by increasing effort that is captured by the final line of
the sum. The third term of the sum captures the change in parental utility
due to a change in school quality combined with the incentives for education.
Suppose the heterogeneity is such that the vector of variables
ξi ≡
(
θi, φ
A
i , φ
H
i
) ∈ Ξ,
characterizing each individual belongs to a finite set of types Ξ. At the same
time the variable Fi follows the distribution F (.) in the compact interval
[0, A] . Note that according to equation (30) if an individual with type ξi and
value for the cost of moving Fi wants to move, another individual with type
ξj = ξi and Fj < Fi also wants to move. Hence, the equilibrium can be
characterized by a set of thresholds. For each type ξ ∈ Ξ there is some Fξ
such that for all i with ξi = ξ ∈ Ξ the individual moves to A if and only if
Fi < Fξ.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium in immigration decisions characterized by
thresholds always exists.
Proof. See the appendix.
In order to understand the effects of differences in parental motivation on
the receiving and sending countries we now use the link of school motivation
to parental motivation stipulated in assumption 1.
Proposition 5 Assume that immigrants are a sufficiently small part of the
population both on the origin and the destination countries, so that
∂ΩA
∂θξ
=
∂ΩH
∂θξ
= 0
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and that wages are at least as high abroad as at home. Within the same skill
level
1. immigrant selection is positive in parental motivation if(
φSA − φUA
)2
(φSH − φUH)2
>
φ′A
φ′H
(31)
φUA +
1
3
(
φSA − φUA
)2(2kA
γTA
θA − ΩA
)
≥ φUH +
1
3
(
φSH − φUH
)2(2kA
γTA
θH − ΩH
)
(32)
2. immigrant selection is negative in parental motivation if both conditions
(31) and (32) are violated.
3. intermediately motivated parents are most likely to emigrate if condition
(31) is violated and condition (32) is satisfied.
4. the least as well as the most motivated parents are the most likely to
emigrate if condition (31) is satisfied and condition (32) is violated.
Proof. See appendix
Notice that condition (31) for positive immigrant selection in parental
motivation can be satisfied even when the skill premium is much lower in the
receiving country. The reason is that the skill premium is usually defined
as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in a particular country, whereas
condition (31) refers to the absolute differences in skilled and unskilled wages
(for children).13 The left-hand side condition (31) captures the relative gain of
being skilled abroad versus at home and therefore the ratio of absolute (wage)
benefits of education at home and abroad. The condition requires that these
relative gains from education are higher than the (square root of) relative
parental wage gains from immigration. In some sense the condition places
an upper bound on parental wages abroad. It nicely captures the trade-off
13We are interested in the future human capital of children and therefore in parental
selection, for which the absolute skill premium for children matters. Grogger and Hanson
(2011) document the importance of the absolute skill premium for parents to explain
immigrant selection in parental education.
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parents face when incentivating their children: forgone parental wage versus
higher expected wages of children. Condition (31) therefore guarantees that
parents incentivate their children more abroad than at home.
But this is not sufficient for positive parental selection. It is additionally
required that children face a more favorable external environment abroad
than at home which is captured by condition (32). This external environment
has two components, namely, the unskilled wage and the school environment.
Notice that condition (32) can be reformulated as
φUA +
1
2
(
φSA − φUA
)
cA
∗
2 ≥ φUH +
1
2
(
φSH − φUH
)
cH
∗
2 (33)
While the unskilled wage is valued by parents per se, the incentives set by
schools increase the child’s probability to get a skilled job and therefore
parents weigh them by the absolute skill premium. This formulation reveals
that condition (32) can be positive even if the school system is worse abroad
than at home as long as unskilled wages are sufficiently higher abroad than
at home.
It will be instructive to consider a situation with two countries that
are identical except for their wage structure. More technically, both coun-
tries have the same exogenous school qualities, 2kA/γ
T
A = 2kH/γ
T
H ; the
same initial distribution of parental motivation; the same distribution of
parental motivation among skill groups; and the same proportion of peo-
ple in skilled employment. Under these conditions, inequality (32) defi-
nitely holds if the absolute skill premium abroad is at least as high as
it is at home. To see this, notice that due to the equality in exogenous
school quality
(
2kA
γTA
θN − ΩA
)
>
(
2kH
γTH
θH − ΩH
)
⇔ ΩA ≤ ΩH , or equivalently
1
NH
∑
θi/φ
H
i ≥ 1NA
∑
θj/φ
A
j . This is true since wages in country A are at
least as high as wages in country H, and the distribution of parental mo-
tivation among skill groups is identical. Obviously if the exogenous school
quality is better abroad than at home so that 2kA/γ
T
A > 2kH/γ
T
H , condition
(32) is relaxed.
When both condition (31) and condition (32) are violated, both the
parental trade-off, and the external environment for children is worse abroad
than at home. This typically happens because the benefits from education
abroad (the absolute skill premium) are lower than at home, hence the in-
centives to educate children are weaker. Moreover, unskilled wages abroad
are not that much higher than at home. This makes parents with a higher
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parental concern worse off and immigrant selection is likely to fall on the
least motivated parents.
When condition (31) is violated but (32) is satisfied, parental selection is
likely to fall on intermediate levels of parental motivation. On the one hand
the tension between parental wages abroad and the child’s future wages is
resolved in such a way that parents work more hours and incentivate their
children less, which is a loss for motivated parents. On the other hand, the
external environment children face abroad is more favorable, which is a gain
for motivated parents. These two countervailing forces are likely to prevent
the most motivated and the least motivated parents from emigrating.
When condition (31) is satisfied but (32) is violated, then parents set
higher education incentives abroad than at home, but the external environ-
ment for children is worse abroad. The benefits of immigration (which are
a quadratic function of θ) first fall in parental motivation till they reach a
minimum and then raise again. Hence, parents willing to emigrate, are likely
to fall into the extreme ends of the distribution of parental motivation. Ob-
serve, that this case only happens rarely. To see this, recall that φ′A > φ
′H
by assumption, hence
(
φSA − φUA
)
>
(
φSH − φUH
)
is a necessary (but not suffi-
cient) condition for condition (31) to hold. This implies that the returns to
education are higher abroad, which positively affect both parental incentives
and school incentives. Therefore condition (32) can only be violated if exter-
nal school quality and average parental motivation at home is much higher
than abroad, and unskilled wages are very similar. But in this case also the
last line of the condition to emigrate given by (30) will become negative and
even very low Fi might not be sufficient to induce emigration.
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Proposition 5 sheds light on how immigration policies that affect immi-
gration costs for all immigrants influence the selection of immigrants and
consequently the educational performance of immigrant children, which is
increasing in parental motivation. The effect of immigration costs clearly
depends on whether or not conditions (31) and/or (32) are satisfied.
When condition (31) and (32) are satisfied Consider first different
host and origin countries for which conditions (31) and (32) satisfied. This
implies that more highly motivated parents have higher benefits from emi-
grating, and therefore selection improves with higher emigration costs. This
14Observe that at least for low-skill immigrants, the main economic motive for immi-
gration reflected by the value of T (φ′
A
i − φ′
H
i ) will also be very low.
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explains why in destination countries where (31) is satisfied:
(i) for a given origin country, immigrant children perform better in host
countries for which the emigration costs are higher,
(ii) for a given host country, the immigrant children who perform better are
those whose parents faced the higher emigration costs.
It is easy to think of examples where case (i) holds. To begin with,
the condition imposed by (31) should be satisfied for emigration from Latin
America to host countries as different as Spain and the U.S.. Also, based on
cultural reasons, it should also be clear that emigrating from Latin America
to Spain involves relatively lower costs than settling in the U.S. Although
not directly related to parents’ selection as in our model, Bertoli, Fernandez-
Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (forthcoming) show that Ecuadorian immigrant
selection to the U.S. is better than for immigrants coming to Spain.
Spain as a host country also provides an example for case (ii). Given its
language and the pre-existence of an important and organized Ecuadorian
community, migrants from Ecuador incur in lower immigration costs than,
for example, immigrants from Romania. Our model then can explain why
Romanian children do better at school than Ecuadorians, conditional on
observable socioeconomic background, to the point of getting higher scores
than them in the Spanish language class (Anghel and Cabrales, 2010).
When condition (31) is not satisfied The implications of the model
can change considerably if we look at host and origin countries where condi-
tion (31) is violated. This happens for example if it is mainly the unskilled
jobs that are better paid in the destination country than in the origin country.
If condition (32) is also violated, it makes sense for the destination country
to adopt policies that reduce immigration costs in order to be able to attract
also immigrants with a high parental motivation, irrespectively of their level
of skills. An example of this situation is given by the immigrants hosted in
Argentina from countries like Bolivia, Peru or Paraguay (Gasparini, Cruces,
and Tornarolli, 2009). These origin countries are characterized by a very high
differences between skilled and unskilled wages, certainly as high as in Ar-
gentina. Also, the wages in Argentina are not that much higher. This gives
some theoretical support to the immigration strategy of Argentina, which
has one of the most lenient immigration regulations in the world (Albar-
rac´ın, 2004).
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If (32) holds, selection falls on the intermediate range of parental moti-
vation. In this case whether it is good for a country to adopt policies that
reduce or increase immigration costs depends on the exact distribution of θ.
Under intermediate selection a decline in immigration costs will expand the
interval of values of θ for which emigration occurs at both extremes which
can influence in either direction the immigrants’ average level of θ. More
specifically, if θ follows a non-increasing density function, then a reduction
in immigration costs induces a decline in the average level of θ (McKenzie
and Rapoport, 2010).
5.1 School quality
In the previous section the incentives to immigrate where both shaped by the
economic incentives and possibly the difference in school systems. It will be
useful to understand the effect of differences in school quality in isolation. In
order to do so, we assume that school quality is the only difference between
H (Home) and A (Abroad), and that school quality is better abroad, i.e.(
2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA
3
)
>
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)
. Under these assumptions immigration occurs
if (30) holds which reduces to
θi
(
φS − φU)2((2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA
3
)
−
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
))
(34)
+
1
2
(
φS − φU)2 φ′i
((
2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA
3
)2
−
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)2)
> Fi.
which after some examination implies:
Proposition 6 The cost that a parent is willing to pay to immigrate in-
creases in school quality, but it increases proportionally more for parents
with higher motivation.
Proof. It is easy to see that the cross derivative of left hand side of (34)
with respect to θ and 2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA
3
> 2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
is positive.
In other words, if immigration costs increase, but at the same time school
quality increases, the selection of immigrants should improve since those that
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get discouraged with the higher costs are more likely to be those for whom the
increase in school quality matters less. Although we do not believe that school
quality per se is the main reason of emigration for the majority of people
who leave their country, the result nevertheless has an interesting testable
implication: the school performance of immigrant children should be better
in countries with higher immigrations costs and high quality (public) schools.
Gibson and McKenzie (2011) provide some evidence for this prediction: they
show that the quality of Australian schools is a key pull factor for the most
qualified immigrants arriving from New Zealand, Tonga and New Guinea
Papua.
6 Immigration and government policies
In this section we discuss how different government policies can affect the se-
lection of immigrants in terms of the importance they attribute to education.
Most of these policies are taken for other reasons, so this discussion should
not be viewed as providing policy implications, and it is also very hard to do
that reasonably in the absence of a general equilibrium model. Our general
aim here is to study the educational side-effects of different policies which af-
fect immigration. Moreover, they often provide empirical implications which
help assess the descriptive validity of our model.
6.1 Naturalization of immigrants
An important issue is whether or not to allow immigrants, and especially
their children, to naturalize. Naturalization typically means easier access to
better jobs in the future.15 Hence, naturalization implies that immigrant
children will have a higher wage for high-skill jobs. This does not hold not
for their parents, and therefore it increases the range of parameters for which
condition (31) holds. In other words, naturalization favors the selection of
highly motivated immigrant parents and leads to better school performance
15Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002) provide evidence that in the U.S. naturalized
immigrants have a more favorable job distribution and higher wages than non-naturalized
immigrants. Moreover, naturalization leads to further wage growth. It allows entry into
certain jobs that are reserved to nationals only, but also gives advantages in terms of
signaling long term commitment and the flexibility to travail. The same results are found
by Steinhardt (2008) for Germany and Fourge`re and Fouge`re and Safi (2008) for France.
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of immigrant children. This prediction in consistent with Dronkers and Fleis-
chmann (2010) who study immigration in 13 EU countries and find that a
significant macro-characteristic for the educational performance of immigrant
children is the destination country’s naturalization policy. In particular, the
more generous the naturalization policy, the higher the educational attain-
ment of immigrant children.
6.2 Family migration versus migration of the head of
the family only
Many countries have tried to restrict the rights of immigrants, in particular
of temporary immigrants. Specially designed guest worker programs limit
family immigration or encourage immigrants to leave their children behind.
Israel recently passed a law dictating that migrant workers are not allowed
to have relationships, let alone children in Israel. Furthermore, children of
migrant workers already in the country are supposed to be deported.16 The
guest worker program proposed by president Bush (but not approved by
the US congress) was heavily debated. An important part of the discussion
concerned the pros and cons of opening the doors to the immigrant’s family.17
From our point of view, an interesting question is the selection of immi-
grant parents of children left in the origin country. Immigrants who have to
leave their children behind cannot motivate directly their learning effort, but
they will have to remit money in order to pay someone to do so.18 Hence
remitting parents maximize
max
c1
θi
(
φSHe+ (1− e)φUH
)
+
(
T − 1
2
c1e
)
φ′Ai
leading to
UAPRi
= Tφ′Ai + θiφ
U
H (35)
16As of September 2011 the deportation of children in state schools has been
delayed, but children not in state schools are planned to be deported. See
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/israel-and-palestine/100528/foreign-workers-israel.
and http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-postpones-deportation-of-foreign-
workers-children-1.348152
17Critics perceived the program as a way of legalizing illegal immigrants from Mexico,
which would lead to a huge inflow of their children.
18Remittance by immigrants is often meant to keep their children in school or to pay
for a better education by schools.
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+(
φSH − φUH
)2
2
(
θ2i
φ′Ai
+ 2θi
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)
+ φ′Ai
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)2)
Since the children of remitting parents have not migrated, they face the same
external environment than if their parents had stayed at home.
Immigration occurs if UA
PRi
− UHPi > Fi, which reduces to
T
(
φ′Ai − φ′Hi
)
+
(
φSH − φUH
)2
2
(
θ2i
(
1
φ′Ai
− 1
φ′Hi
)
+
(
φ′Ai − φ′Hi
)(2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)2)
> Fi
It is easy to see that the left hand side is decreasing in θi since
1
φ′Ai
< 1
φ′Hi
and parents who emigrate without their children are now negatively selected
because incentivating the child has become more costly.19
One might argue that if children are not allowed to come, parental moti-
vation should not be an important selection criterion, as the effects of their
children at school is the only externality generated by motivation. However,
laws can change over time and immigrants who were not allowed to bring
their children might later be allowed to reunite as is illustrated by many
historical examples.20 There are good reasons to believe that new temporary
immigrant programs are likely to lead to the same result, since the pres-
sure toward granting immigrants more rights and at least basic family rights
has increased. The United Nations and the International Labor Organiza-
tion have enacted a number of international conventions in this direction
(Weissbrodt, 2003). Unless this is fully anticipated and temporary family
separation involves sufficiently low cost, our analysis would suggest that a
host country can get a better immigrant selection if family immigration is
facilitated from the beginning. The negative selection in parental motivation
when forced to leave their children behind can explain the bad school per-
19Antman (2011) provides evidence that parental migration from Mexico to the US
reduces the time the children left behind allocate to studying, especially for sons. Also
for Mexico, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find evidence of a significant negative effect
of migration on schooling attendance and attainment.
20There are many historical examples of this possibility. Guest worker programs all over
the world served to establish permanent immigrant minorities. Consider for example Ger-
many, which signed a guest worker program with Turkey in 1961, allowing for temporary
immigration only. While many Turkish guest workers returned when they were supposed
to return, the agreement between Germany and Turkey ended in 1973 and many Turkish
guest workers established themselves permanently, bringing their families later on.
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formance of the later reunited children of German guest workers (Dronkers
and de Heus, 2010).
6.3 The role of culture orientation at school
Countries differ in their cultures. As a consequence, the values transmitted
at schools are likely to be different across countries. In order to consider
the effect of school cultural differences in the decision to migrate, we assume
parents care about the school orientation. We describe their utility by:
UP = θ
(
φSe+ (1− e)φU)∆ + (T − 1
2
c1e
)
φ′,
where ∆ captures the cultural differences between parents and the school.
To be more precise, let ∆ be
∆ = 1− (Φ− τ)2 .
In this expression, Φ and τ summarize the culture orientation of the school
and parent respectively. If ∆ = 1 there is no cultural alienation. We assume
native parents do not feel any cultural alienation, the possibility of cultural
alienation only affects immigrants. Following the same steps as in Lemma
1 it is easy to derive the incentive system implemented in the immigration
receiving country as
cA2 =
2
3
(
φSA − φUA
)(2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
(36)
cI1i =
(
φSA − φUA
)(∆θi
φ
′A
i
− 2
3
θTA
γTA
+
∆NIΩI +NNΩN
3(NN +NI)
)
cN1i =
(
φSA − φUA
)( θi
φ
′N
i
− 2
3
θTA
γTA
+
∆NIΩI +NNΩN
3(NN +NI)
)
Hence the utility of an immigrant parent living in country A is given by
UPiA = Tφ
′A
i + ∆θiφ
U
A (37)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2
2
(
∆2θ2i
φ′Ai
+
2∆θi
3
(
2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
+
φ′Ai
9
(
2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)2)
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Hence, parental utility clearly falls with larger differences in cultural orien-
tation. Since all children go to school, cultural alienation even affects chil-
dren who remain unskilled. Moreover, the probability to remain unskilled
increases in cultural alienation since it reduces the effort incentives set by
parents, a reduction which is not fully compensated by incentives set by
schools and hence children’s’ learning effort falls.
The utility of staying at home where there is no cultural alienation is as
before given by (29). In the appendix we show in Section A.5 how this affects
immigrant selection. Not surprisingly, the conditions for positive selection
within the same skill group are harsher. In particular, for positive selection
the following two conditions have to be satisfied:
∆2
(
φSA − φUA
)2
(φSH − φUH)2
>
φ′Ai
φ′Hi
(38)
and
∆φUA +
1
3
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)2(2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
(39)
> φUH +
1
3
(
φSH − φUH
)2(2θTH
γTH
− ΩH
)
.
and a violation of both conditions clearly leads to negative selection.
Observe that conditions (38) and (39) are violated for low ∆ even if condi-
tions (31) and (32) hold, which are the corresponding conditions for positive
immigrant selection in parental motivation in the absence of cultural con-
cerns. Parents now evaluated differently the gains from education abroad,
which affects the incentives they provide themselves, but also how they eval-
uated the external environment their children face abroad. The possibility of
cultural alienation drives away the most motivated immigrants and may lead
to negative selection. The effect of cultural alienation is to reduce the weight
parents assign to the future wage opportunities of children abroad, both to
the unskilled wage and the absolute wage difference between skilled and un-
skilled wages, hence only immigrant countries where the unskilled wage and
the wage difference between the skilled and unskilled wage are very large can
aspire to attract the most motivated immigrants if cultural differences mat-
ter. This imposes an important policy trade-off for the destination country.
The fact that school orientation may affect selection implies that flexibility
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on the school orientation and incorporation of some foreign values at schools
could favor the attraction of more motivated immigrants.
This implication of our model might throw some light on recent empiri-
cal findings by Dronkers (2010). In a cross-country comparison of language
skills using the PISA data, Dronkers (2010) found that pupils from Islamic
countries have a substantial disadvantage in language scores compared to
immigrant pupils from other countries of origin, which cannot be explained
on the basis of individual socioeconomic background, school characteristics
or the education system’s characteristics.21 Given that the Muslim culture
differs considerably from the mainstream culture of most immigrant receiv-
ing countries, and that many Muslims have strong cultural concerns, our
model predicts that in their case it is the less motivated parents who emi-
grate. As shown in the appendix, the educational effort of Muslim children is
lower than that of other immigrants through two channels. On the one hand,
they are less stimulated by their parents, who care relatively less about their
education. On the other hand, cultural alienation reinforces this lack of con-
cern even further. This problem could be mitigated by allowing for Muslim
schools. Indeed, Dronkers (2010) provides evidence that a higher share of
pupils with an immigrant background in a school hampers educational per-
formance (of all students), but if these pupils have the same regional origin
(Islamic countries; non-Islamic Asian countries), a higher share of pupils with
an immigrant background at that school promotes educational performance.
7 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we propose a model of endogenous migration and human capital
production. The model allows us to understand the differential selection,
and hence performance, of immigrants from the same country into different
destinations. It can also explain why students from different origins exhibit so
widely different performances in the same host country, even after controlling
for observable characteristics. The model also informs about the effects of
different policies in terms of the selection of immigrants. Finally, we study
endogenous reactions of the school system to the presence of immigrants, and
through that channel, the impact on natives and immigrants alike.
In our model, we emphasize motivation as a key characteristic to under-
stand the effects of immigration. Although clearly unobservable, motivation
21As captured by the degree of differentiation in secondary education.
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may be correlated with other relevant attributes like work ethic or sociability.
Our analysis can be extended to understand the role of families in improving
assimilation of immigrants and their impact on host societies. It is important
to bear in mind that there is no clear correlation between motivation and
other observable measures of skill intensity like, for example, years of school-
ing. In this sense, our analysis warns against immigration policies aiming
exclusively at attracting immigrants merely on their skills.
The focus of this paper is on the school effects of immigration in the host
country. However, applying our model it is straightforward to understand
the effect on the educational system in the source country. For example, if
immigrants were positively selected and, thus, the most motivated parents
leave their countries, this would imply negative effects on their compatriots
who stay home. In particular, this can lead to lower school incentives in the
source country, and hence to smaller learning efforts of non-emigrant children
under plausible conditions.22. Refocusing the analysis to the home country
is an obvious follow-up of this paper.
We restrict our analysis to the effects of immigration on the school sys-
tem. Clearly, immigration involves effects beyond schools; in the health sec-
tor, in the labor market and in many other socially important phenomena.
Hence, we do not provide any specific prediction about the optimal policy
mix regarding the number of immigrants. Nevertheless, our model uncovers
important side and feedback effects, which are generally overlooked in the
design and implementation of immigration policy. Notwithstanding the im-
portance of these side effects, a rigorous evaluation of immigration policies
requires a model able to capture their general equilibrium implications; an
avenue we leave for future research.
Another important extension concerns the interactions between the polit-
ical economy of the host country and education; immigrants, or at least their
children, often eventually achieve political rights23 and could importantly,
and perhaps unexpectedly, affect political outcomes.24
22For example, if (18) holds in the home country. The same is also true if (18) fails but
conditions (16) and (17) hold and all emigrants are high-skilled.
23An interesting model analyzing when immigrants get political rights and its conse-
quences is Ortega (2005).
24See Levy (2005) for an example of the subtle interaction between different types of
groups and education provision in a political economy context.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Using the notation introduced in (8) and (9), the optimal level of incentives
of native and immigrant parents (7) can be written as
cN1i = ψ
N
i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
(
θT
γT
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NIcI1
2N
)
. (40)
cI1l = ψ
I
l
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
(
θT
γT
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NIcI1
2N
)
. (41)
The average parental incentives of immigrants and natives can therefore be
written as
cN1 = ΩN
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
θT
γT
(
φS − φU)+ NNcN1 +NIcI1
4N
. (42)
cI1 = ΩI
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
θT
γT
(
φS − φU)+ NNcN1 +NIcI1
4N
. (43)
Notice as well that cI1 =
(
ΩI − ΩN
) (
φS − φU) + cN1 . Using this and simpli-
fying, cN1 and c
I
1 become:
cN1 =
(
φS − φU)(4N −NI
3N
ΩN +
NI
3N
ΩI − 2
3
θT
γT
)
. (44)
cA1 =
(
φS − φU)(3N +NI
3N
ΩI +
N −NI
3N
ΩN − 2
3
θT
γT
)
, (45)
and therefore:
NNcN1 +NIc
I
1 =
2
3
(
φS − φU)(2 (NIΩI +NNΩN)− (NN +NI)θT
γT
)
. (46)
Plugging (46) into (40), (41) and 6) we then get the desired result.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Using the first order conditions for children’s effort decision (5) we get:
UHM =
θT
N
(
NN∑
k=1
((
φS − φU) (cN1k + c2)+ φU)+ NI∑
l=1
((
φS − φU) (cI1k + c2)+ φU)
)
+
(
T − 1
2rN
c2
(
NN∑
k=1
(
cN1k + c2
)
+
NI∑
l=1
(
cI1k + c2
)))
γT .
Hence
∂UHM
∂c2
=
θT
N
(
NN∑
k=1
(
φS − φU)+ NI∑
l=1
(
φS − φU))−(1
2
(
NN∑
k=1
cN1i +
NI∑
l=1
cI1l
)
+Nc2
)
γT
Nr
= 0.
So
c2 =
rθT
γT
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NIcI1
2N
, (47)
For parents the only change now is that school resources cost money which
they will have to pay from general taxation, but given the quasi-linearity
in income of utility and that taxation is already decided at the time parents
choose their effort, the amount of those taxes do not affect the parental effort
decision. Hence
cj1i =
θi
φ′i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
c2 for j = N ; I. (48)
Similar calculations as in Lemma 1 yield the desired result.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let I+ (Fξ) = {i ∈ N |ξi = ξ, Fi < Fξ} , and I− (Fξ) = {i ∈ N |ξi = ξ, Fi ≥ Fξ} .Denote
by N+ (Fξ) the cardinality of I+ (Fξ) and by N− (Fξ) the cardinality of I− (Fξ)
Then, under a threshold equilibrium, we can write for any vector of thresh-
olds F = (Fξ)ξ∈Ξ ,
ΩI (F ) =
∑
i∈I+(Fξ)
θi
φ′i∑
ξ∈Ξ N+ (Fξ)
, ΩH (F ) =
∑
i∈I−(Fξ)
θi
φ′i∑
ξ∈Ξ N− (Fξ)
.
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Clearly
ΩA (F ) =
N+ (F ) ΩI (F ) +NNΩN
(NN +N+ (F ))
.
Let for any i with ξi = ξ ∈ Ξ
Gξ (F ) ≡ T
(
φ′Ai − φ′Hi
)
+ θi
(
φUA − φUH
)
(49)
+
θ2i
2
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′Ai
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′Hi
)
+θi
((
φSA − φUA
)2(2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA(F )
3
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(23 θTHγTH − ΩH(F )3
))
+
1
2
(
φ′Ai
(
2
3
θTA
γTA
− ΩA(F )
3
)2 (
φSA − φUA
)2 − φ′Hi (23 θTHγTH − ΩH(F )3
)2 (
φSH − φUH
)2)
Under these conditions existence is guaranteed by a straightforward appli-
cation of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, since G (.) is a continuous function
and we have defined F to belong to the convex, compact set [0, A] .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Under the assumption that ∂ΩNA
∂θξ
= ∂ΩH
∂θξ
= 0 and we only look at individuals
within the same skill group, i.e. individuals are homogeneous in wages we
need to calculate the derivative of the left-hand side of (30) with respect to
parental motivation and determine its sign. This derivative is given by(
φUA − φUH
)
+θi
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
+
((
φSA − φUA
)2(2
3
θTA
γTA
− 1
3
ΩA (F )
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(23 θTHγTH − 13ΩH (F )
))
,
Using the link between school and parental motivation the last line can be-
comes
1
3
((
φSA − φUA
)2(2kA
γTA
θA − ΩA
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(2kAγTA θH − ΩH
))
so that the derivative can be rewritten as
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θi
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
+
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
1
3
((
φSA − φUA
)2(2kA
γTA
θA − ΩA
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(2kAγTA θH − ΩH
))
It is positive if both lines are positive which gives us conditions (31) and
(32). If both (31) and (32) are violated the derivative is negative. If (31)
is violated and (32) holds, the derivative is positive for sufficiently small θi
and negative for sufficiently high θi. Hence, (30) reaches its maximum for
some intermediate value of θi. Finally, if (31) holds and (32) is violated the
derivative first decreases in θi and then increases in θi. Hence, (30) reaches
its minimum for some intermediate value of θi. 
A.5 Cultural alienation
The utility of living abroad is given by (37) while the utility of staying at
home is
UPiH = Tφ
′H
i + θiφ
U
H
+
(
φSH − φUH
)2
2
(
θ2i
φ′Hi
+ 2θi
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)
+ φ′Hi
(
2
3
θTH
γTH
− ΩH
3
)2)
Hence immigration occurs if UPiA − UPiH > Fi, namely
T
(
φ′Ai − φ′Hi
)
+ θi
(
∆φUA − φUH
)
+
θ2i
2
(
∆2
(
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′Ai
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′Hi
)
+
θi
3
(
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)2(2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(2θTHγTH − ΩH
))
+
2
9
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′Ai
(
2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)2
− (φSH − φUH)2 φ′Hi (2θTHγTH − ΩH
)2)
> Fi
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By looking at the derivative of the LHS with respect to parental motiva-
tion we can now study how parental motivation influences the immigration
decision within the same skill group. This derivative is
(
∆φUA − φUH
)
+
1
3
(
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)2(2θTA
γTA
− ∆NIΩI +NNΩN
(NN +NI)
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(2θTHγTH − ΩH
))
+θi
(
∆2
(
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′Ai
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′Hi
)
.
Positive selection requires both lines to be positive which gives rise to con-
ditions (38) and (39).
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